Fürst, M. forthcoming. “Phenomenal Knowledge, Imagination, and Hermeneutical Injustice.”
In C. Werner and I. Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Imagination and Experience. Routledge.
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of phenomenal knowledge in understanding the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. In particular, I argue that understanding that is enriched by imaginative phenomenal knowledge is a powerful tool to mitigate hermeneutical injustice. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I investigate the requirements for a full understanding of the experiences at the center of hermeneutical injustice and I argue that phenomenal knowledge is key to full understanding. Secondly, I distinguish between direct phenomenal knowledge and imaginative phenomenal knowledge. Thirdly, I investigate whether one can gain imaginative phenomenal knowledge of the experiences of members of social groups other than one´s own. I consider reasons for pessimism in this regard and show that they are not conclusive. Then, I provide a model of how one can gain imaginative knowledge of the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I connect the varieties of phenomenal knowledge with different grades of understanding an experience and I outline how understanding that involves imaginative phenomenal knowledge helps to mitigate various forms of hermeneutical injustice.
Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice"
The Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1), 229-250. link: academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad024/7080901
Abstract:
Fricker´s (2007) insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.
Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Implicit Bias and Qualiefs"
Inquiry. 1-34. link to the paper: Full article: Implicit bias and qualiefs (tandfonline.com)
Abstract:
In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also share some characteristics of what Gendler calls ‘aliefs’. I proceed as follows: First, I develop a general theory of qualiefs. Second, I argue that implicit bias involves generic qualiefs that involve experiences that have been shaped by stereotypes. Elaborating on the particular content of a generic qualief, I explain why we are unaware of the bias even though it involves an experience. Third, I demonstrate that the qualief-model best explains the key features of implicit bias: it accounts for the biases´ implicitness and automaticity. Moreover, it elucidates how implicit bias can be insensitive to logical form and evidence, but at the same time it can serve as propositional input to further mental states.
Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Phänomenale Begriffe"
In: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (ed.): Handbuch: Philosophie des Geistes. Metzler. 1-14.
Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich phänomenale Begriffe auf besondere Art und Weise auf diese Zustände beziehen – sie konzeptualisieren sie anhand ihrer subjektiven, phänomenalen Eigenschaften (d.h. anhand ihrer ‚Qualia‘). Phänomenale Begriffe sind für eine Vielzahl an Diskussionen in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie des Geistes relevant. Sie spielen eine zentrale Rolle in der Debatte, ob phänomenale Zustände auf physikalische Zustände reduzierbar sind oder ob ihnen ein eigenständiger ontologischer Status zukommt. Phänomenale Begriffe bieten eine Möglichkeit, den Physikalismus gegen anti-physikalistische Argumente zu verteidigen, indem argumentiert wird, dass die spezielle Konzeptualisierung phänomenaler Zustände unsere Intuitionen über deren metaphysische Natur beeinflusst. Darüber hinaus erhellen phänomenale Begriffe auch erkenntnistheoretische Fragen der Philosophie des Geistes. Sie erklären unseren direkten Zugang zu phänomenalen Zuständen sowie die Spezifika phänomenalen Wissens Schließlich sind phänomenale Begriffe auch im Rahmen einer generellen Begriffs-Theorie interessant, da es sich um eine spezielle Art von Begriffen handelt, die außergewöhnliche Eigenschaften besitzen.
Fürst, M. 2023: "Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology" (link_to_the_paper.pdf)
Erkenntnis, 88, 3259-3289.
Abstract:
The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH.
Fürst, M. 2021: "Reflection on Mary in the Black-and-White Room."
In: Helen de Cruz (ed.), Philosophy Illustrated. 42 thought experiments to broaden your mind. Oxford University Press.
Abstract:
Think of the first time you had a particular experience: the first time you tasted an exotic fruit, felt snow on your skin, or smelled the ocean. Maybe some of your friends or family had already enjoyed this kind of experience, they told you about it, and they tried to describe it—nevertheless, having the experience was something completely different. No description, comparison, or information about the causes of the experience conveyed to you what you gained by having the experience yourself: knowledge of what the experience is like, of the experience’s so-called phenomenal character. The thought that there is something special about experiences, namely, that their phenomenal character cannot be conveyed by descriptions, is already present in C. D. Broad (1925). He argued that even a logically omniscient archangel, endowed with the power to perceive the structures of atoms, could not find out that a substance with a particular structure has, for example, the distinctive smell of ammonia to humans. If Broad was right, then it is not our limited knowledge about physics or chemistry that explains why we cannot figure out what an experience is like before having it. Rather, theoretical descriptions are fundamentally unable to convey what experiences are like. Jackson’s thought experiment about Mary the scientist elaborates in detail the idea that no theoretical knowledge suffices for knowing the phenomenal character of experiences—not even complete physical knowledge. Notably, the thought experiment does not only reveal that knowledge about experiences is special. It also aims to show that the very nature of experiences, and of consciousness in general, is special.
Fürst, M. 2019: "On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie" (link to the paper)
dialectica 73 (1-2), 105-127.
Abstract:
The cognitive phenomenology thesis has it that conscious cognitive states essentially exhibit a phenomenal character. Defenders of ‘conservatism’ about cognitive phenomenology think that the phenomenology of thought is reducible to sensory phenomenology. In contrast, proponents of ‘liberalism’ hold that there is a proprietary, sui generis cognitive phenomenology. Horgan develops a morph-sequence argument to argue for liberalism. The argument is based on the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology zombie, i.e. a man who does not understand Chinese but shares the behavior and sensory phenomenology with his twin who does understand Chinese. I argue that the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology-zombie fails to settle the debate between conservatives and liberals. The roots of the ineffectiveness of the argument lie in the diverse readings of sensory phenomenology which flesh out the relation between sensory phenomenology and concepts differently but explain the conceivability of the scenario equally well. The lesson to learn is that to adjudicate the debate about cognitive phenomenology, we first have clarify the notion of sensory phenomenology.
Fürst, M. 2017: “On the Limits of the Method from Phenomenal Contrast” (link to the paper)
Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2), 168-188.
Abstract:
The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate about cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation for the method´s dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on the first-person performances of the phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that the introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical stand-off in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.
Fürst, M. 2014: “A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts” (link to the paper)
In: Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.): Contemporary Dualism. A defense. Routledge, 112-136.
Abstract:
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of phenomenal concepts that has strong explanatory power does not explain away dualist intuitions—rather, it reinforces dualism.
Fürst, M. 2012: “Exemplarization – A Solution to the Problem of Consciousness"
Philosophical Studies 161 (1), 141-151.
Abstract:
In recent publications, Keith Lehrer developed the intriguing idea of a special mental process—exemplarization—and applied it in a sophisticated manner to different phenomena such as intentionality, representation of the self, the knowledge of ineffable content (of art works) and the problem of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I am primarily concerned with the latter issue. The target of this paper is to analyze whether exemplarization, beside explaining epistemic phenomena such as immediate and ineffable knowledge of experiences, can also solve the ontological problem of consciousness. In particular, Lehrer suggests that if we consider exemplarization, zombies cannot provide an argument for anti-physicalism. I argue that exemplarization offers neither a physicalist explanation of the conceivability of zombies nor an elucidating physicalist account of their impossibility. Therefore, exemplarization cannot offer a physicalist solution to the ‘‘hard problem’’ of consciousness.
Fürst, M. 2011: “What Mary’s Aboutness Is About”
Acta Analytica 26 (1), 63-74.
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed as follows: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts which captures the Mary-scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutive phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.
In C. Werner and I. Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Imagination and Experience. Routledge.
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of phenomenal knowledge in understanding the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. In particular, I argue that understanding that is enriched by imaginative phenomenal knowledge is a powerful tool to mitigate hermeneutical injustice. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I investigate the requirements for a full understanding of the experiences at the center of hermeneutical injustice and I argue that phenomenal knowledge is key to full understanding. Secondly, I distinguish between direct phenomenal knowledge and imaginative phenomenal knowledge. Thirdly, I investigate whether one can gain imaginative phenomenal knowledge of the experiences of members of social groups other than one´s own. I consider reasons for pessimism in this regard and show that they are not conclusive. Then, I provide a model of how one can gain imaginative knowledge of the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I connect the varieties of phenomenal knowledge with different grades of understanding an experience and I outline how understanding that involves imaginative phenomenal knowledge helps to mitigate various forms of hermeneutical injustice.
Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice"
The Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1), 229-250. link: academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad024/7080901
Abstract:
Fricker´s (2007) insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.
Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Implicit Bias and Qualiefs"
Inquiry. 1-34. link to the paper: Full article: Implicit bias and qualiefs (tandfonline.com)
Abstract:
In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also share some characteristics of what Gendler calls ‘aliefs’. I proceed as follows: First, I develop a general theory of qualiefs. Second, I argue that implicit bias involves generic qualiefs that involve experiences that have been shaped by stereotypes. Elaborating on the particular content of a generic qualief, I explain why we are unaware of the bias even though it involves an experience. Third, I demonstrate that the qualief-model best explains the key features of implicit bias: it accounts for the biases´ implicitness and automaticity. Moreover, it elucidates how implicit bias can be insensitive to logical form and evidence, but at the same time it can serve as propositional input to further mental states.
Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Phänomenale Begriffe"
In: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (ed.): Handbuch: Philosophie des Geistes. Metzler. 1-14.
Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich phänomenale Begriffe auf besondere Art und Weise auf diese Zustände beziehen – sie konzeptualisieren sie anhand ihrer subjektiven, phänomenalen Eigenschaften (d.h. anhand ihrer ‚Qualia‘). Phänomenale Begriffe sind für eine Vielzahl an Diskussionen in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie des Geistes relevant. Sie spielen eine zentrale Rolle in der Debatte, ob phänomenale Zustände auf physikalische Zustände reduzierbar sind oder ob ihnen ein eigenständiger ontologischer Status zukommt. Phänomenale Begriffe bieten eine Möglichkeit, den Physikalismus gegen anti-physikalistische Argumente zu verteidigen, indem argumentiert wird, dass die spezielle Konzeptualisierung phänomenaler Zustände unsere Intuitionen über deren metaphysische Natur beeinflusst. Darüber hinaus erhellen phänomenale Begriffe auch erkenntnistheoretische Fragen der Philosophie des Geistes. Sie erklären unseren direkten Zugang zu phänomenalen Zuständen sowie die Spezifika phänomenalen Wissens Schließlich sind phänomenale Begriffe auch im Rahmen einer generellen Begriffs-Theorie interessant, da es sich um eine spezielle Art von Begriffen handelt, die außergewöhnliche Eigenschaften besitzen.
Fürst, M. 2023: "Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology" (link_to_the_paper.pdf)
Erkenntnis, 88, 3259-3289.
Abstract:
The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of our sensory experiences and argue for a weak phenomenal holism (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH.
Fürst, M. 2021: "Reflection on Mary in the Black-and-White Room."
In: Helen de Cruz (ed.), Philosophy Illustrated. 42 thought experiments to broaden your mind. Oxford University Press.
Abstract:
Think of the first time you had a particular experience: the first time you tasted an exotic fruit, felt snow on your skin, or smelled the ocean. Maybe some of your friends or family had already enjoyed this kind of experience, they told you about it, and they tried to describe it—nevertheless, having the experience was something completely different. No description, comparison, or information about the causes of the experience conveyed to you what you gained by having the experience yourself: knowledge of what the experience is like, of the experience’s so-called phenomenal character. The thought that there is something special about experiences, namely, that their phenomenal character cannot be conveyed by descriptions, is already present in C. D. Broad (1925). He argued that even a logically omniscient archangel, endowed with the power to perceive the structures of atoms, could not find out that a substance with a particular structure has, for example, the distinctive smell of ammonia to humans. If Broad was right, then it is not our limited knowledge about physics or chemistry that explains why we cannot figure out what an experience is like before having it. Rather, theoretical descriptions are fundamentally unable to convey what experiences are like. Jackson’s thought experiment about Mary the scientist elaborates in detail the idea that no theoretical knowledge suffices for knowing the phenomenal character of experiences—not even complete physical knowledge. Notably, the thought experiment does not only reveal that knowledge about experiences is special. It also aims to show that the very nature of experiences, and of consciousness in general, is special.
Fürst, M. 2019: "On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie" (link to the paper)
dialectica 73 (1-2), 105-127.
Abstract:
The cognitive phenomenology thesis has it that conscious cognitive states essentially exhibit a phenomenal character. Defenders of ‘conservatism’ about cognitive phenomenology think that the phenomenology of thought is reducible to sensory phenomenology. In contrast, proponents of ‘liberalism’ hold that there is a proprietary, sui generis cognitive phenomenology. Horgan develops a morph-sequence argument to argue for liberalism. The argument is based on the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology zombie, i.e. a man who does not understand Chinese but shares the behavior and sensory phenomenology with his twin who does understand Chinese. I argue that the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology-zombie fails to settle the debate between conservatives and liberals. The roots of the ineffectiveness of the argument lie in the diverse readings of sensory phenomenology which flesh out the relation between sensory phenomenology and concepts differently but explain the conceivability of the scenario equally well. The lesson to learn is that to adjudicate the debate about cognitive phenomenology, we first have clarify the notion of sensory phenomenology.
Fürst, M. 2017: “On the Limits of the Method from Phenomenal Contrast” (link to the paper)
Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2), 168-188.
Abstract:
The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate about cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation for the method´s dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on the first-person performances of the phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that the introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical stand-off in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.
Fürst, M. 2014: “A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts” (link to the paper)
In: Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.): Contemporary Dualism. A defense. Routledge, 112-136.
Abstract:
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of phenomenal concepts that has strong explanatory power does not explain away dualist intuitions—rather, it reinforces dualism.
Fürst, M. 2012: “Exemplarization – A Solution to the Problem of Consciousness"
Philosophical Studies 161 (1), 141-151.
Abstract:
In recent publications, Keith Lehrer developed the intriguing idea of a special mental process—exemplarization—and applied it in a sophisticated manner to different phenomena such as intentionality, representation of the self, the knowledge of ineffable content (of art works) and the problem of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I am primarily concerned with the latter issue. The target of this paper is to analyze whether exemplarization, beside explaining epistemic phenomena such as immediate and ineffable knowledge of experiences, can also solve the ontological problem of consciousness. In particular, Lehrer suggests that if we consider exemplarization, zombies cannot provide an argument for anti-physicalism. I argue that exemplarization offers neither a physicalist explanation of the conceivability of zombies nor an elucidating physicalist account of their impossibility. Therefore, exemplarization cannot offer a physicalist solution to the ‘‘hard problem’’ of consciousness.
Fürst, M. 2011: “What Mary’s Aboutness Is About”
Acta Analytica 26 (1), 63-74.
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed as follows: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts which captures the Mary-scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutive phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.
Full list of publications:
Edited Volumes, Journals and Special Issues
· Grazer Philosophische Studien. Vol. 95/1-- 4 (2018); Vol. 96/1-- 4 (2019) ; Vol. 97/1--4 (2020); Vol 98/1--4 (2021) Vol. 99/ 1-4 (2022)
(with Johannes Brandl, Marian David and Maria Reicher) (4 issues/year)
Vol. 100/ 1--4
(with Marian David, Guido Melchior and Dolf Rami)
· The Philosophy of Keith Lehrer. Special Issue of Philosophical Studies 161 (1), 2012. (with Guido Melchior)
· Intentionality and Experience. Special Issue of Acta Analytica 26 (1), 2011. (with Guido Melchior)
· Gehirne and Personen/Brains and Persons. Frankfurt: Ontos, 408 pages, 2009. (with Wolfgang Gombocz and Christian Hiebaum)
· Analyses, Arguments, Accounts. (Proceedings of the 8. International Congress of the Austrian Society for Philosophy) Frankfurt: Ontos, 512 pages.
2008. (with Wolfgang Gombocz and Christian Hiebaum)
Articles
. Fürst, M. forthcoming: "Implicit Bias and Qualiefs". Inquiry. 1-34 .
. Fürst, M. forthcoming. “Phenomenal Knowledge, Imagination, and Hermeneutical Injustice.” In C. Werner and I. Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Imagination and Experience.. Routledge.
· Fürst, M. forthcoming: “Phänomenale Begriffe”. In: Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. Hrsg. von V. Hoffmann-Kolss, Metzler.
. Fürst, M. 2024: "Closing the Conceptual gap in Epistemic Injustice". The Philosophical Quarterly, 74 (1), 229-250.
. Fürst, M. 2023: "Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology." Erkenntnis 88, 3259-3289.
. Fürst, M. 2021: "Reflection on: Mary in the black-and-white room". In: Helen de Cruz (ed.): Philosophy Illustrated: 42 thought experiments to broaden your
mind. Oxford University Press.
. Fürst, M. 2019: "On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie". dialectica 73 (1-2), 105-127.
· Fürst, M. 2017: “On the Limits of the Method from Phenomenal Contrast”. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3(2), 168-188.
· Fürst, M. 2014: “A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.” In: Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.): Contemporary Dualism: A Defense.
Routledge, 112-136.
· Fürst, M. 2013: “Sensory Phenomenology and the Content Indeterminacy Problem”. In: D. Moyal-Sharrock, V. A. Munz, A. Coliva (eds.): Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Druckwerker: 146-148.
· Fürst, M. 2012: “Exemplarization – A Solution to the Problem of Consciousness?” Philosophical Studies 161 (1), 141-151.
· Fürst, M. 2012: “On Zombie Beliefs” In: C. Jäger, W. Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values and Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34.
International Wittgenstein Symposium. Druckwerker, 83-85.
· Fürst, M 2011: “What Mary’s Aboutness Is About”. Acta Analytica 26(1), 63-74.
· Fürst, M. 2009: “Why Mary’s Qualia Are Not Just a Cognitive Mode of Presentation.” In: Brains and Persons. Ontos, 193-202.
· Fürst, M. 2009: “Phenomenal Concepts and the Hard Problem”. In: V. Munz, K. Puhl & J. Wang (eds.), Language and World. Proceedings of the 32.
Intern. Wittgenstein Symposium. Druckwerker, 145-47.
· Fürst, M. 2009: “The Dilemma of Papineau’s Account of Phenomenal Concepts” In: M. Gabbay (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference of
the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association, 37-47.
· Fürst, M. 2008: “Why the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Save Physicalism”. In: A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in
Philosophy in the Sciences. Proceedings of the 31. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Druckwerker, 106-108.
· Fürst, M. 2008: “The Qualia of Conscious Intentionality.” In: H. Bohse & S. Walter (eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6.,
Paderborn: Mentis, 374-385.
· Fürst, M. 2004: “Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument”. Acta Analytica 19, 143-152.
· Fürst, M. 2004: „Über die Phänomenalität intentionaler Zustände“. In: J. Marek & M. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis. Proceedings of the 27.
Wittgenstein Symposium. 111-113.
Other
· “Introduction.” Philosophical Studies 161(1), 1-5. (with Guido Melchior) 2012.
· Bookreview: P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa & D. Stoljar (eds.), There Is Something about Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s
Knowledge Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 6, 145-149. 2006.